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This paper assesses the validity of comparisons between the current ﬁ  nancial 
crisis and past crises in the United States. We highlight aspects of two National 
Banking Era crises (the Panic of 1873 and the Panic of 1907) that are relevant 
for comparison with the Panic of 2008. In 1873, overinvestment in railroad debt 
and the default of railroad companies on that debt led to the failure of numerous 
brokerage houses, precursor to the modern investment bank. During the Panic 
of 1907, panic-related deposit withdrawals centered on the less regulated trust 
companies, which had only indirect access to the existing lender of last resort, 
similar to investment banks in 2008. The popular press has made numerous 
references to the banking crises of the Great Depression as relevant comparisons 
to the recent crisis. This paper argues that such an analogy is inaccurate. The 
previous banking crises in U.S. history reﬂ  ected widespread depositor withdraw-
als whereas the recent panic arose from counterparty solvency fears and large 
counterparty exposures among large complex ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. In histori-
cal incidents, monitoring counterparty exposures was standard banking practice 
and the exposures were smaller. From this perspective, the lessons from the past 
appear less directly relevant for the current crisis.
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  The financial and monetary systems of the United States have experienced three 
quarters of a century without an obvious and economically dangerous banking crisis; 
such a record provides evidence of successful maintenance of banking stability.  The 
financial market faced some challenges in the past thirty years, especially the Latin 
American debt crisis in the early 1980s, the Savings and Loan crisis (1989-1993), and 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998. However, those problems now seem 
like small potatoes in comparison with what just happened.
1 
The United States has just experienced its first full-fledged financial crisis since 
the Great Depression, and financial markets have garnered much attention since 2008 as a 
result.  Something changed to make enduring banking stability unsustainable.  We believe 
that those changes arise from the evolution of banking markets, the size of participant 
institutions and their interconnections, the complexity of new financial products traded 
and the globalization of the financial markets.  The cumulative effect of these changes did 
not become evident until the termination of a prolonged and then intense housing bubble, 
reflecting an overextension of credit toward the housing market in the United States.  In 
retrospect, we can view the collapse from a conventional perspective – the assets were 
excessively concentrated in one sector, credit growth allocated toward that sector was 
growing rapidly, the financial system was heavily leveraged, and that sector faced 
precipitous and unprecedented asset value declines.   
                                                 
1  The Latin American debt 1981 crisis could have been much worse without government intervention on a 
large scale.  The LTCM crisis could be viewed, to some extent, as foreshadowing the recent crisis, 
emphasizing the interconnectedness of financial intermediaries and counterparty risk. LTCM’s weak 
financial condition was viewed as idiosyncratic, rather than an indicator of the general condition of 
financial intermediaries. 2 
 
 
  In stark contrast to the seventy five years of relative banking stability was the 
sixty years of banking instability between 1873 and 1933: three major banking crises in 
1873, 1893, and 1907, three more banking panics in 1930 and 1931, and then the 
complete collapse of the banking system in March 1933, which prompted extensive 
government intervention.  What, indeed, is anomalous is that the U.S. established a 
central bank, the Federal Reserve System, in 1913 in part to prevent a recurrence of the 
National Banking Era crises and yet the worst banking crises occurred in 1930 and 1931.  
The Banking Acts of 1933 and of 1935 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 were 
designed to prevent a recurrence of the banking panics of the Great Depression.  The 
legislation had been successful in preventing banking panics like those that occurred 
during the Great Depression.  But the current crisis bears little resemblance to the 
banking disturbances of the Great Depression.   
  The difference between the periods of stability and instability, we suspect, arises 
from a distinction among the sources of the crises and an isolation of how shocks with 
financial ramifications were transmitted throughout the financial system (systemic risk).  
Historical instances of crises display systemic risk arising from depositor withdrawals 
amidst financial panic; fear of insolvency of the banking institution may play a role in the 
decision to run.  However, fear of insolvency also may be excessive, meaning that bank 
runs can be irrational and generate contagion in the form of a banking panic.  In response 
to banking crises arising from depositor fears, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company 
guarantee of deposits alleviates the risk of an unjustified panic on the banking system.
2  
In the recent crisis, bank depositors were not engaging in widespread liquidation of 
                                                 
2 Deposit insurance has negative effects on monitoring bank activity by depositors, but those issues are 
secondary to the themes in this paper.  Reported runs on IndyMac were justified and still did not spark a 3 
 
 
deposits for cash. In the initial stage of the crisis, the financial institutions that failed were 
few, mainly large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs) and their non-bank forms 
(LCNFIs).  Instead, the uninsured “depositors” of banks and other financial institutions – 
lenders of cash for overnight funding of banking activities – ran from an entire form of 
intermediation, the repurchase agreement market (see Gorton 2008, 2009a,b).
3  The crisis 
in the credit market was reflected in the complete collapse of the commercial paper and 
repo markets.
4 
  The recent crisis, as inferred by the actions of key policymakers, contains aspects 
of systemic risk that extend beyond what has been observed in historical episodes of 
crises.  After the failure of Lehman Brothers, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
leadership chose to prevent the failure of financial institutions, explicitly enacting “too 
big to fail.”  It was perceived that the failure of AIG and Citibank, for example, would 
risk so much financial distress that it would be better to use public money to prevent its 
failure.  We do not know what the ramifications of those failures would have been 
because they did not fail.  Also, we do not know the model that the policymakers had in 
mind when they made the decision to provide aid to those institutions.  From the times of 
Bagehot, with only a few exceptions, no bank was regarded as too big to fail or to have 
the right to an explicit bailout.  The belief that the suspension (or failure) of a financial 
institution will expose the financial system to an excessive risk of systemic failure 
suggests that we are dealing with the predominance of a different component of systemic 
risk.  The nature of systemic risk had not changed; however, different components of 
                                                                                                                                                 
panic. 
3 Gorton (2009) sees enough similarities to describe the recent crisis as a banking panic. We are 
emphasizing key differences that will be explained further below. 
4 See Brunnermeier 2008. 4 
 
 
systemic risk played a larger role in transmitting the shock through the financial system 
during the recent crisis.  
  The description in this article will focus attention upon historical antecedents to 
the current crisis, both in terms of the market and economic conditions that sparked a 
financial crisis and the responses by market participants and public authorities to the 
events.  Our analysis suggests that the recent crisis is likely a harbinger of the form of 
future crises in which LCFIs and LCNFIs, as counterparties, are the key triggers for 
generating financial distress.  As a result, rigorous analysis of the bank data measures that 
policymakers used to make the determination to aid insolvent institutions will be crucial 
inputs for improving the design of robust financial regulatory structures. 
 
II  Defining Systemic Risk in the Presence of “Too Big to Fail” Institutions 
  The key to understanding the origin of financial crises resides in the concept 
“systemic risk.”  We describe systemic risk as the risk of widespread transmission of a 
shock that has financial ramifications. Systemic risk implies that an initial shock is 
persistent as it is transmitted throughout the financial system.
5  Various explanations of 
systemic risk attempt to make the concept empirically relevant and measurable.  We first 
define systemic risk with the goal of making the concept relevant for accurate historical 
descriptions of the phenomenon of banking panic as observed in the Great Depression 
and during the National Banking Era.
6  We then emphasize characterizations of systemic 
risk that are more relevant for the recent financial crisis in the United States. 
                                                 
5 Persistence may imply “correlation” and “connectedness” of financial institutions in ways that spread the 
financial shock throughout the system.  See Lo 2008.  Kaufman and Scott (2003) describe three main 
definitions of systemic risk, none of which allows for unexplained “contagion.” 
6 Historical descriptions of banking panics differ from modeling assumptions for a model of banking 5 
 
 
  Loss of depositor confidence in the banking system is one example of a 
mechanism to generate systemic risk.  The loss of depositor confidence in banks has been 
portrayed as an irrational response to an information deficit about individual bank 
solvency.  The word “panic” as defined in the dictionary refers to “a sudden, unreasoning 
hysterical fear often spreading rapidly.”  Contagion, however, need not be confined to an 
irrational response.  A bank run is a response by depositors to an information gap 
concerning either liquidity or solvency (or both) to an individual bank.  Suppose a long 
line of depositors awaiting their chance to liquidate their deposits forms at a bank; the 
existence of the line may generate fear and uncertainty about the financial status of that 
bank among the depositors of other banks.   If that observation leads to bank runs on 
other banks for just that reason – that a depositor thinks “other banks are suffering runs, 
so maybe I should remove my deposits from my bank” – then the subsequent banking 
crisis would be an observation of contagion-based systemic risk.  The demandable 
liabilities held by depositors create the danger that banks may have insufficient liquid 
assets to satisfy depositor demands.  Widespread liquidation risk is the source of banking 
panics that arose during the National Banking Era of the United States and the Great 
Depression.  The depositor withdrawals can be motivated by rational or irrational 
reasons, and historical descriptions of banking panics indicate numerous instances in 
which irrational contagion predominates.
7  But it is widely appreciated that the provision 
of deposit insurance essentially has quelled systemic risk arising from depositors in the 
United States. 
                                                                                                                                                 
panics.  Descriptions of banking panics as examples of irrational contagion may be accurate, but are not 
helpful for building an economic model that explains the observation. Rational agents faced with imperfect 
and asymmetric information can, in an economic model, generate events that look like the banking panics 
that we describe. 6 
 
 
  A variety of the mechanisms can generate systemic risk; Rochet and Tirole 
(1996b) describe a number of them and differentiate among important sources. 
 One 
mechanism to generate systemic risk is a notion that accords with an information-based 
contagious bank panic, and that can be empirically consistent with what is described 
above.
8  Another mechanism to generate systemic risk is the propagation of failures via 
interbank lending (or other interbank exposures).  This mechanism is relevant when Bank 
B’s balance sheet activities (and off balance sheet activities) are transmitted and projected 
upon other financial firms (directly affecting the solvency of other firms) when the shock 
hits, creates losses for bank B, and forces bank B into insolvency.  A separate mechanism 
is macroeconomic risk in which a real economic event affects the asset values of a large 
number of financial intermediaries.
9  Of the mechanisms to generate systemic risk, the 
latter two seem particularly important for the recent crisis.
10   
  The loss of confidence of banks (or of financial intermediaries in general) in the 
solvency of each other, referred to as counterparty risk, is similar to depositor contagion 
and likely arises from the information about the macroeconomic risks, a negative 
aggregate shock to balance sheets, and the widespread interconnection between financial 
institutions.  Counterparty risk indicates that interbank exposures are not insured.  Such 
risks have been within the financial system throughout US history.  In the past, however, 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 See Wicker (1996, 2000). 
8 A banking panic could be rational given imperfect information about the solvency of a bank or the 
banking system.  But it could be problematic in cases in which the rational action for the entire banking 
system is for depositors to leave deposits alone. That strategy may be a sub-optimal equilibrium given that 
the optimal strategy of individuals – to liquidate deposits and reduce their loss probability to zero – raises 
the probability of system failure.  The optimal solution requires coordination that is unachievable. 
9Gorton and Calomiris (1991) discuss macroeconomic risk and the inability of depositors to determine 
unambiguously solvent from insolvent banks.  Notably, Rochet and Tirole (1996b) mention explicitly the 
fall of real estate prices as an explicit macroeconomic risk. 
10 We see no role for irrational contagion as an explanation for the recent crisis.  The distinction is 
important for separating accurate descriptions of history from modeling assumptions that generate 7 
 
 
risk exposures from other intermediaries were both less extensive and monitored by the 
banks, even if on occasion the monitoring was not so successful,.  Counterparty 
monitoring among financial institutions may have decreased over time for various 
reasons. One major reason for diminished bank monitoring of each other is the perception 
that some large, complex, financial institutions are perceived as “too big to fail.”   
  Recent history lends substance to the existence of “too big to fail” policies.  The 
failure of Continental Illinois in 1984 and the regulatory responses to its failure led to the 
perception that the largest banks in the United States were viewed as essentially ‘too big 
to fail.’  Rochet and Tirole (1996a,b) emphasize the fact that 66 banks had uninsured 
deposits at Continental Illinois that exposed them to potential failure.  The deposit 
exposures were in excess of the capital at those 66 banks and if Continental Illinois failed 
and uninsured depositors took a loss, there was some likelihood for a “propagation of 
failure through interbank lending.” If some banks are “too big to fail,” it implies that 
policy makers fear that allowing an insolvent institution to fail will impose negative 
external effects on other intermediaries and risk magnifying the financial contraction.  
The policymaker actions to prevent a bank failure reveal the perceived systemic risk; but 
that risk arises from counterparty exposures and counterparty actions as opposed to 
depositor actions. 
  We have just experienced a banking crisis in which financial intermediaries lost 
confidence in the solvency of other financial intermediaries.  In such a setting, the failure 
of a large bank may pose a threat to other banks when the failing bank is heavily indebted 
to other banking intermediaries.  If that indebtedness is in short-term credit instruments, 
the creditors may not roll over their funding.  This risk is described as funding liquidity 
                                                                                                                                                 
empirical estimates that are consistent with historical data. 8 
 
 
risk by Brunnermeier (2009), and when that problem becomes widespread across 
institutions, it produces market liquidity risk. The origins of a financial crisis arise from 
these interconnections between financial intermediaries. The difference between the 
current financial crisis and those that preceded it is the increasing importance attached to 
the mechanism generating systemic risk that involves the loss of counterparty confidence, 
the interconnectedness of financial intermediaries, and the widespread exposure of 
financial intermediary solvency to real estate values.  These mechanisms existed during 
banking crises in U.S. history, however, regulatory restrictions and the actions of market 
participants to limit and monitor their exposures to other intermediaries limited their 
systemic implications. 
   
III  A LOOK AT HISTORY FOR GUIDANCE TODAY 
  The defining characteristic of banking panics in the National Banking Era was the 
suspension of cash payment to depositors by New York City banks followed by selected 
suspensions in the interior, usually bringing an end to further bank closures arising from 
panic related withdrawals.  The suspension of convertibility of bank deposits into cash 
was an attempt to forestall the rapid liquidation of bank deposits, and limit the hoarding 
of cash outside the banking system. 
  The decision to suspend cash payment was made separately by local clearing 
house bank associations; it could be either partial or complete.  If partial, then individual 
banks might pay up to a specific amount in cash (usually $50 or $100).  Also, New York 
City banks might restrict payment to individual depositors while still making 9 
 
 
discretionary payments to the interior.  Initiative for the country as a whole originated 
with the New York Clearing House.  
  Sprague (1910) identified four proximate effects of the suspension of cash 
payment:  1) payroll difficulties, 2) dislocation of domestic exchanges (the value of cash 
and deposits in different locations could differ measurably), 3) the increase in hoarding of 
cash, and 4) the emergence of a currency premium (during the gold standard).  The 
immediate impact of the suspension of cash payment was partial disruption of the 
payments mechanism, which increased real transactions costs.  Wages were paid in 
currency; and if business firms experienced difficulty in obtaining currency there might 
have been temporary closings, layoffs and the creation of innovative currency substitutes 
(scrip).  The domestic exchanges were also disrupted because bankers were reluctant to 
make out of town remittances.  The existence of a currency premium was an added 
incentive not to deposit currency in banks. 
  Neither bank runs nor bank failure was the way most people experienced a 
banking crisis.
11  The number of bank suspensions was relatively small both in New York 
City and in the interior, except in 1893.  Table 1 shows the estimated total number of 
bank suspensions in New York and the interior in each of the three major panics of the 
National Banking Era. 
                                                 
11 Most people experienced neither. 10 
 
 
  Another measure of bank panic severity is the percentage of bank suspensions 
relative to the total number of banks.  The percentages are also set out in Table 1.1 for 
each of the banking panics except 1873.
12  It is quite clear that the panics of the national 
banking era had less serious failure outcomes than the Great Depression, the single 
exception being 1893.  The bank suspension ratio fell below 1 percent in 1883, 1890, and 
                                                 
12 We have no estimate of the number of unincorporated banks for that year.   
Table 1.1   Bank Suspensions in New York City and the interior during 
Banking Panics: 1873-1907 and Percent of Total Banks in Suspension 
Source: Wicker (2000) 
  New York 
City  Interior Total  Percent of total bank 
suspensions to total banks 
1873
*  37  64  101  N.A. 
September         
         
1884  15  27  42  0.006 
May         
         
1890  10  8  18  0.0015 
November         
         
1893  3  500  503  0.042 
(May-




         
1907  13  60  73  0.0026 
(October-
December)       
 
1930        0.034 
1931(I)        0.0295 
1931(II)        0.0427 
*The proportion of state and national bank suspensions of total number of 
state and national banks was 0.0165 in 1873; Wicker (2000) had not 
uncovered estimates of total number of unincorporated banks in 1873. 11 
 
 
1907.   For the Panic of 1893, the ratio was 4.3 percent, the same as the second panic of 
the Great Depression. 
  In 1873 and 1893, issues of clearing house loan certificates preceded the 
suspension of cash payment – four days in 1873 and six weeks in 1893.  These initiatives 
were announced simultaneously in 1907.  Clearing House Loan Certificates enabled the 
member banks to conserve much needed cash by providing an instrument for discharging 
debt at the Clearing House. 
 
The 1873 Banking Panic 
  We have to go back more than 130 years to identify a speculative boom that 
resulted in a banking crisis.  The 1873 banking panic was caused by the reckless 
expansion of railroad mileage in what was then the western territory.  As railroad 
construction outpaced the freight and passenger demands, railroad defaults struck first the 
investment and brokerage houses that facilitated the credit allocation to the railroads, and 
left numerous European investors with substantial losses.  The initial losses in 1873 
forced the closure of the well-known brokerage of Jay Cooke and Company, along with 
other lesser known but still important brokerage houses.  
  Although not the first to fail, Jay Cooke’s demise on September 18 drew national 
and international attention. According to Henrietta Larson, Cooke’s biographer (1964, 64) 
the firm was overloaded with weak investments and advances made to specific railroads 
including Northern Pacific.  She wrote, “the speculative promotion of railroads beyond a 
reasonable expectation of returns under the drive of postwar conditions.”  The closing of 
Cooke’s affiliates in Washington, D.C. and Philadelphia brought pandemonium to New 12 
 
 
York City, where stock prices collapsed by nearly 10 percent as measured by the Cowles 
stock price index.  More than 40 brokerage houses and private banks failed in September 
in New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.; the closed brokerage houses, the 
predecessor of the investment bank, were the institutions that suffered most directly from 
the railroad losses.  Over time, the losses filtered down into the banking system because 
many banks lent directly to railroads, and the railroad losses had knock on effects on 
peripheral businesses, many of which borrowed from banks. For the country as a whole, 
failures among brokerage houses account for about 60 percent of total suspensions.  Only 
one national bank and two trust companies failed in New York City.  The loss of 
depositor confidence was confined to the savings banks all of which suffered runs. Loss 
of depositor confidence in the interior was greatest in Chicago.  But banking unrest 
extended to Memphis and all along the Atlantic coast from Petersburg, Virginia to 
Savannah, Georgia. 
  The New York Clearing House responded to the banking crisis of 1873 by pooling 
bank reserves and the issue of clearing house loan certificates.  Unlike the response to 
crises in 1860 and 1861, reserve pooling did not deter the New York Clearing House from 
suspending cash payment. Although cash reserves had fallen to an extremely low level, it 
is still debatable whether suspension was necessary.  We have no direct measures of cash 
hoarding for 1873, but we have the specie and legal tender totals for New York City 
national banks.  In the first week of September 1873, legal tender reserve was over $33 
million; by the week of October 20, those reserves dwindled to less than $6 million 
(Wicker 2000, page 32). The threat of falling to zero was non-trivial. 13 
 
 
  Contemporaries described the post panic years as “of gloom and depression.”
13  
The qualitative evidence is insufficient to verify that claim, and quantitative measures are 
lacking.  Unemployment estimates do not begin before 1890.  We only have annual GNP 
estimates for 1873.  We know that annual estimates smooth the quarterly figures.  Romer 
(1988) provides estimates of real GNP indicating that real GNP was increasing between 
1873 and 1875.  Annual estimates of industrial production by Joseph Davis (2004) 
suggest that the contraction in 1873 was less severe than previously estimated.  Balke and 
Gordon (1999) reveal only a one percent decline in 1873-74, offering little justification 
for labeling the episode a depression.   
Assessment: Common Characteristics of Panics in 1873 and in 2007-2009 
The crisis of 1873 displays several similarities to the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2009.  Most notably, the excessive issuance of credit allocated toward railroad finance led 
to the financial crisis in 1873, which resembles the over-issuance of credit allocated 
toward home mortgage finance from 2001 to 2007.  Less obvious, but perhaps nearly as 
important, the source of much of the investment capital in 1873 aimed toward railroad 
expansion came from overseas investors.  Similarly, overseas capital financed a large 
portion of the recent home mortgage credit expansion.  In the recent financial crisis, 
investment capital was transformed into complex and opaque financial claims using 
elaborate extensions of financial contract design.  However, at its basis, the recent 
financial crisis arose from the same basic elements of past crises – excessive lending, 
increasing leverage, and faulty underwriting of loans. 
 
The Panic of 1893 
                                                 
13 Tax Commissioner’s Report, New York Times, July 28, 1874, page 8. 14 
 
 
  The 1893 panic stands apart from all other banking panics of the National 
Banking Era.  Three fourths of all bank suspensions in 1873, 1893 and 1907 occurred in 
that year.  The bank suspensions were widely diffused geographically and the contraction 
in quarterly GNP was almost as severe as the contraction in the first year of the Great 
Depression.  The runs on urban banks were by fear ridden depositors who were testing 
bank solvency.  The suspended banks reopened shortly thereafter and were probably 
solvent at the time of closure.  For the country as a whole, one in four suspended banks 
reopened and resumed normal operations; the reopened banks had liabilities equal to the 
same proportion, one fourth the liabilities of the total suspended.
14  The proportion of 
reopened banks to total suspended differed by region.  One third of suspended banks 
resumed in the Pacific region and slightly more than 36 percent in the Southern region.  
In Denver, Louisville, and Kansas City the proportion was even higher. 
  The 1893 banking crisis was accompanied by a stock market collapse.  The stock 
market plunged on May 3 and a large industrial firm (National Cordage) failed the next 
day.   The immediate impact was felt in the closing of the brokerage houses, a signature 
of the 1893 (and 1873) panic, which had been speculating in National Cordage stock.  
Repercussions were transmitted to the rest of the country.  The collapse in depositor 
confidence was reflected in increased hoarding of cash.  Like 1873, we do not have 
monthly estimates of currency in circulation but we have what was effectively the level 
of bank reserves available to national banks in New York City.  In the week of May 15, 
the New York City national banks held $134 million in specie and legal tender; that total 
fell to a nadir of $76.5 million by the week of August 7, 1893. 
                                                 
14 We have no information regarding the need for capital injections prior to reopening the suspended banks. 15 
 
 
  The Balke-Gordon quarterly GNP estimates reveal a decline in real GNP of 14.7 
percent from the fourth quarter of 1892 to the fourth quarter of 1893. This compares with 
a 19 percent decline from the third quarter of 1929 to the fourth quarter of 1930.  Chart 1 
displays the Balke-Gordon real GNP estimates as a proportion of peak real GNP prior to 
the recession/depression.  The contraction of 1893 is the line with the circular observation 
indicators, whereas the Great Depression is the line with the diamond squares.  The 
contraction following 1893 was sharper than the Great Depression for the first three 
quarters following the peak. There was, however, no severe depression during the next 
four years observable in the real GNP figures, and real GNP had regained the peak level 
of real GNP after nine quarters.  While 1896 was a year of the doldrums when real GNP 
declined by 2.9 percent, thereafter, the economy began to recover. 
  The crisis in banking during the Panic of 1893 took hold mainly in the interior of 
the country.  Although 500 banks failed during this financial crisis, only three of those 
banks were New York banks.  Whereas the New York City banks supplied currency to the 
interior during the 1873 crisis, those banks were not supplying sufficient currency to the 
interior in 1893.  Perhaps related, there was little indication of a financial crisis in Wall 
Street; the mild upward spikes in the call loan interest rate (see Chart 2) were modest 
even in comparison to some non-panic periods. 
Assessment: The Panic of 1893 and the Current financial Crisis 
  The crisis of 1893 displays few similarities to the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009.  
The financial shock was transmitted through the investment brokerage houses, similar to 
1873 and the investment banking industry in 2008-09.  The key difference is that the 16 
 
 
2008-09 financial crisis affected the money center, whereas the Panic of 1893 affected 
mostly the interior banking institutions. 
 
The 1907 Banking Panic 
  The 1907 banking panic had its origins in New York City with relatively little 
effect on the interior of the country with respect to financial distress.  The source of the 
disturbance was trust companies, which were state chartered institutions that were 
allowed to invest in a wider assortment of assets than national banks.  The trusts grew 
rapidly in the ten years prior to the panic largely because of their looser regulatory 
requirements.  Trust companies held fewer reserves than national banks because trust 
accounts had much lower turnover; trust depositors were not using their trust accounts to 
write many checks.  As a result, trusts were not central to the payments system.  
  New York City national banks were central to the payments system, especially the 
largest ones, and it was that functional difference that set up the tension between the trust 
companies and the commercial banks. Because the trust companies were not important 
players in the payments system, the trust companies in New York City as a group chose 
not to become members of the New York Clearing House, even though membership was 
offered.  The restrictions necessary to join the association – one crucial element, a 10 
percent cash reserve balance -- were deemed more costly than the benefits of 
membership, even though these requirements were less than half the cash reserve of 
national banks.  As a result, the trust companies fell outside the effective regulatory 
framework of the New York Clearing House, and when the Panic of 1907 struck, the trust 
companies had no direct access to the clearing house and its potential store of liquidity.   17 
 
 
  The National Bank of Commerce announced that it would no longer clear checks 
for the Knickerbocker Trust during the Panic of 1907, an example of a form of 
“counterparty risk” that would not occur between clearing house member banks.   
Prior to its closure on October 22, 1907, the Knickerbocker Trust Company requested 
support from the New York Clearing House, which was rejected.  The main justification 
for the rejection was that fact that the Knickerbocker Trust was not a member of the New 
York Clearing House.  J.P. Morgan also refused to intervene.  While JP Morgan is 
rightfully given credit for organizing the support to bail out the trust companies later in 
the crisis, it is ironic that he was also partly responsible for allowing Knickerbocker Trust 
to fail. 
  Trust companies and New York City national banks both issued a large proportion 
of loans to the call loan market on the New York Stock Exchange.  It could have been this 
shared credit exposure that finally convinced the New York Clearing House and J.P. 
Morgan to support the Trust Company of America after Knickerbocker Trust failed.  
Loans on call held by New York national banks actually increased during the panic, likely 
reflecting a transfer of those loans from trust companies to national banks.
15  The shared 
exposure to call loan investments was an important source of interconnectedness between 
these two different intermediary types. 
  In retrospect, the decision to allow Knickerbocker Trust to fail appears to have 
been a mistake; by 1907, the New York City trust companies in aggregate had loan and 
deposit aggregates that rivaled those of New York City national banks.
16  Further, the 
historical data analysis of the 1907 panic highlights the relative lack of national bank 
                                                 
15 See Moen and Tallman 1992. 
16 Knickerbocker Trust reopened in March 1908 after an infusion of $2.4 million in additional capital. 18 
 
 
failures along with relatively stable national bank loan and deposit figures for New York 
City banks.  These statistics hide the substantial contraction in trust company deposits 
and loans in New York City (over 30 percent), which suggests that net credit to the 
economy contracted along with the contraction in real output.  The misleading measures 
of financial distress – the national bank deposit and loan aggregates from 1907 – bears 
resemblance to the recent crisis.  Gorton (2009) emphasizes the role of the repo market as 
a credit source and emphasizes the important role of the shadow banking system to the 
growth of credit in the past two decades.  Measures of credit that do not include repo 
credit will underestimate its importance in the recent financial distress. 
  Real GNP declined 12 percent between the 2
nd quarter of 1907 and the first 
quarter of 1908.  Chart 1 demonstrates that the depth of the contraction in real GNP in the 
1907 business cycle matches the sharp pace of decline in the 1893 contraction.  Further, 
both these contractions appear to decline more sharply than the initial output contraction 
in the Great Depression.  Call money interest rates (Chart 2) spiked to 20 percent in 
October and stayed above 10 percent for the remainder of the year, when normal ranges 
were from 3 to 6 percent.  Cash hoarding, as reflected in the currency to deposits ratio, 
increased notably during the panic.  Chart 3 displays the currency to deposits ratio taken 
relative to the level of that ratio at the beginning of the crisis.  The chart shows that the 
ratio increased by over 10 percent throughout the panic. 
  The New York Clearing House addressed the crisis by restricting the 
convertibility of payments into currency and issued over $80 million Clearing House 
Loan Certificates (essentially, temporary issues credit that could be used to pay debts 
among clearing house members).  Similar actions taken by clearing houses across the 19 
 
 
country essentially increased the available currency supply for those depositors who 
demanded currency. 
Assessment: The Panic of 1907 and the Current financial Crisis 
  The Panic of 1907 has a number of similarities to the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2009.   
1)    The 1907 financial crisis centered among the trust companies that engaged in 
financial services more akin to an investment bank than to a commercial bank, 
but trusts still funded their activities with demand deposits.  Trusts were struck 
with panic related withdrawals by depositors who were concerned about the 
safety of their deposits. In the recent financial crisis, investment banks 
suffered a funding crisis mainly because lenders would not renew their loans 
to fund the investment bank’s activities, a more informed set of “depositors.” 
 
2)    Neither trust companies in 1907 nor investment banks in 2007-09 had direct 
access to the relevant lender of last resort – the New York Clearing House for 
the trust companies in 1907 and the Federal Reserve System for investment 
banks in 2007-09. 
 
3)    Both financial crises highlight the undesirable outcomes arising from uneven 
regulation on competing financial intermediaries. Neither trusts nor modern 
investment banks were important parts of the payments system. However, they 
both had important interconnections to banks that were central to the 
payments system. The crises focused on trusts in 1907, and on investment 
banks in 2007-2009; the financial distress of these intermediaries affected key 
credit markets that were common to all banks.  Thus, the focus of the crises on 
specific intermediary types – even if they were outside the payment system -- 
still put the payment system and its key institutions at risk nevertheless.  
 
Banking Panics of the Great Depression 
  We will refer specifically to the three waves of bank suspensions during the Great 
Depression: November-December 1930, January 1931, April-August 1931, and 
September-October 1931.  The banking panics of the Great Depression bear little or no 
resemblance to what happened in 1873, 1893, and 1907.  Nor do they resemble what has 
happened in the current financial crisis. There were multiple crises, or rather a sequence 
of crises, and not a single crisis.  Also the crises of the Great Depression differed in 20 
 
 
origin, severity, and the actions of private market participants and the public sector 
institutions in response.   
  Post-Civil War panics were single episode events whereas there were multiple 
banking crises in 1930 and 1931.  The significance of multiple banking panics resides in 
the fact that there was a progressive and continual deterioration of depositor confidence 
as revealed by Federal Reserve notes in circulation, seasonally adjusted.
17   During the 
1930 and 1931 banking crises, hoarding accelerated during the panic, leveled off at a 
higher plateau and then accelerated again at the onset of a new crisis.  Depositor 
confidence was never restored.  Chart 3 displays the currency to deposit ratios taken 
relative to the ratios at the beginning of the financial crises: October 1907 and November 
of 1930.  Although hoarding increases more sharply in 1907, the peak is dwarfed as the 
continual increase in hoarding as the Great Depression continued.  Note how the currency 
deposits ratio increased after the first banking crisis in November 1930, but accelerated 
dramatically after September 1931, more than doubling by February 1932. 
  The 9000 bank failures during the Great Depression exaggerates the failures that 
resulted from banking panics; still, the panic related suspensions greatly outnumbered 
those in 1873, 1893, and 1907.
18  
  Prior to October 1931, there was no unambiguous legislative authority for 
assisting distressed banks not related to a banking crisis.  Lender of last resort 
responsibilities of the Fed applied explicitly to panic related distress (e.g., solvent banks 
in a liquidity crisis) and to member banks of the Federal Reserve System.  The continued 
                                                 
17 There were no instances of organized “suspensions of convertibility” during the Great Depression panics, 
and despite the implied costs of suspension, there is a view that the imposition of such suspensions may 
have limited the continuous liquidation of deposits and drain of currency from banks.  See Friedman and 
Schwartz 1963 page 311. 21 
 
 
increase in panic and non panic related bank suspensions led President Hoover in 1931 to 
propose the establishment of a National Credit Corporation, an agency whose purpose 
would be to lend to solvent and illiquid member banks with an inadequate supply of 
eligible paper to discount at the Fed. In early 1932, the agency was transformed into the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) and was empowered to lend to all banks in 
need, both solvent and insolvent.  The Chairman of the Fed also served as Chairman of 
the RFC, thereby blurring the lender of last resort responsibilities of the Fed. 
Contributing to bank stability in panic free 1932 were numerous loans made by the RFC.  
By July, the RFC had made $643 million in loans to 3,600 banks.  There was no further 
erosion of depositor confidence in 1932.   
  The role of the RFC expanded after the banking collapse of March 1933.  The 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation provided capital injections to banks from 1932 
through 1935.
19  The RFC purchased the (new issues of) preferred stock in the needy 
banks. By the end of June l934 the RFC owned 23.6 percent of the capital stock, notes 
and debentures of all insured banks. Ultimately, the agency was responsible for acquiring 
over 25 percent of the capital of insured banks.
20  It was successful in restoring depositor 
confidence and forestalling future bank failures. But the restructuring of the banking 
system in 1933 did not increase lending at either Federal Reserve member or FDIC 
insured banks.  Between October 1933 and November 1935, total loans of member banks 
declined by 9.3 percent.  For all insured banks, the decline was 4.4 percent between June 
1934 and June 1935.  The massive injection of bank capital by the government apparently 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 See Wicker (1996) page 111, and Wicker (2000) page 143. 
19 This support for the banking system was not related to banking panics. 
20 See Studentski and Krooss 1963, page 384, Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941, page 75. 22 
 
 
failed to expand loans.
21  We may well ask was the injection too small or were there other 
factors as work?
22   
  Another distinguishing feature of the banking disturbances of the Great 
Depression was their origin.  National banking era panics (at least 1873 and 1907) had 
their origin in the central money market from which they spread to the interior of the 
country.  During the Great Depression, their origin was the interior, a characteristic 
shared with 1893.  When the panic originated in New York City, it was regarded as of 
national significance.  When banking disturbances originated in the interior, it was far 
from obvious that they were of national importance and the financial press did not refer 
to such events as a banking panic. The accelerated rate of bank suspensions in the final 
two months of 1930 (the first banking panic) was not described in the press as a panic.  
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) were the first to characterize these suspensions as a 
banking panic.
23  They assigned a causal role to these suspensions to explain why the 
money stock fell and the depression deepened, thereby giving dramatic emphasis to the 
banking crises.  We did not learn of the origin of the first banking crisis (November 1930) 
until the 1980s when John McFerrin’s 1939 book on the southern investment bank of 
Caldwell and Company was rediscovered.  The case for regarding the November and 
December 1930 bank suspensions as purely regional is persuasive.  Recent work by 
Richardson (2007) reinforces this conclusion, and further provides evidence that the 
                                                 
21 See Mason (2000). 
22 Calomiris and Wilson (2004) suggest that banks in New York City were capital constrained. Further 
investigation of this important issue seems warranted. 
23 There remains active debate as to whether the failure of the Bank of United States in New York City 
sparked a nation-wide banking panic.  It is interesting that New York City banks apparently suffered fewer 
system-wide constraints than the banks in the interior. 23 
 
 
causes of bank distress during the Great Depression resulted from both insolvency and 
illiquidity of banks. 
Assessment:  Great Depression Panics and the Current financial Crisis 
  The severity of the financial crisis of the Great Depression is revealed by the 
number of bank suspensions, the increase in hoarding, and a 33 percent decline in the 
money stock, for which there is no equivalent in the current 2007-09 financial crisis.  
Commercial bank suspensions in the current crisis were minimal in the immediate 
aftermath.
24  There has been no general loss of depositor confidence.  The monetary base 
more than doubled and the M2 money stock has increased substantially resulting from 
Fed actions.   There are several crucial differences between the present financial situation 
and the multiple crises of the Great Depression.   
1)  The current financial crisis bears little resemblance to the first two banking panics 
in 1930 and 1931.  These events were similar to the banking panics during the 
National Banking Era because the banks lacked sufficient liquid funds to meet 
depositor withdrawals.  Widespread deposit withdrawals from banks resulted from a 
contagious run on the banks.  Many of these banks were not insolvent; the panic 
could have been managed with standard central banking principles as suggested by 
Bagehot's rule – lend freely and at a high penalty rate.
25  The Federal Reserve policy 
makers left the rule to be applied at the discretion of individual reserve banks and the 
consequence was an inordinate number of bank suspensions.
26 
 
2)  By the latter half of the 1929-33 financial crises, bank insolvency finally played 
an important role in accounting for bank suspensions from banking panics.  By that 
time, the deepening depression began to take its toll – credit contraction, loan 
defaults, and security (asset) depreciation combined to threaten the solvency of many 
banks.   
                                                 
24 Suspensions of banks have increased as the ramifications of the housing price collapse and the severe 
recession have percolated through the economy. 
25 Recent evidence in Richardson (2007) confirms that many banks that closed as a result of these runs were 
only in suspension temporarily.  
26 The policies were thereby idiosyncratic – there was an obvious difference for example between the St. 
Louis District (eighth) and the Atlanta District (sixth) towards supplying liquidity to banks in their 
jurisdiction.  The Atlanta Bank promoted liquidity provision to the banks that it serviced.  Banks in that 
portion of Mississippi serviced by the Atlanta Bank experienced a notably lower failure rate than the failure 
rate among those banks in Mississippi that were served by the St. Louis District Federal Reserve Bank. See 




3)  Wall Street is clearly the locus of the current crisis, as it was in 1873 and 1907.  In 
contrast, the banking panics of the Great Depression had their origin in the interior of 
the country and were region specific. Between 1929 and 1933, there was no major 
banking disturbance or banking panic in the central money market (Wall Street, New 
York City).  The markets remained calm and stable even after the collapse of one of 
the largest banks in the country – The Bank of United States – in December 1930.   
 
4)  The Fed presided over a massive, 33 percent contraction in the money stock. 
Their operative policy concentrated erroneously on the nominal interest rate, not the 
real interest rate – along with the level of discount window borrowings.  They did not 
assume responsibility to prevent the closure of non-member banks.  Also, the discount 
window was constrained to require “eligible paper” for extending credit.   In this 
crisis, Fed policymakers have responded in vigorous and imaginative ways.  They 
have asserted their leadership in the crisis by finding creative ways to issue more 
liquid assets for illiquid assets. But as the crisis turned into a concern about the 
solvency of the banking system, Fed policies were unable to stem those losses.  
 
Common characteristics of the Current Crisis with the Great Depression 
 
  Of the similarities between the current crisis and the Great Depression, 
government intervention in the banking system has particular relevance. At the time of 
Roosevelt's inauguration on March 4, l933 the banking system of the U.S. had virtually 
collapsed.  Banks had closed their doors in 33 states; deposit restrictions were in effect in 
10, and optional closing in 5.  Roosevelt merely recognized the existing situation by 
declaring a nationwide bank holiday on March 6.
27 The Emergency Banking Act granted 
the government the necessary power to reopen the banks at the sole discretion of the 
Secretary of the Treasury. The government had agreed to guarantee the soundness of each 
of the reopened banks. Only one-half of the nation's banks were permitted to reopen in 
March. Licenses to reopen were completed by April 12 at which time 13,000 banks had 
reopened with deposits of $31 billion and 4,215 permanently closed with deposits of $4 
billion.  
                                                 
27 A bank holiday was a legal artifice for closing the banks without compromising their solvency. It was not 




IV  SOME FEATURES COMMON AMONG THE PANICS 
  Intervention by private or public entities has been an element of every banking 
crisis since the Civil War.  On no occasion during the National Banking Era has a banking 
panic run its course without remedial action.  In the absence of a central banking 
authority, the intervention took place through the voluntary associations of banks known 
as clearing houses.  The clearing house was the main mechanism for leadership initiatives 
executed by prominent New York City bankers, often with direct support through the US 
Treasury.  Prior to the creation of the Fed, the Treasury and the private New York 
Clearing House intervened, not to “save” insolvent institutions, but to provide liquidity to 
what were perceived as illiquid institutions.  The big banks were, in 1907, the liquidity 
providers in financial crises when their balance sheets were perceived as strong. Insolvent 
institutions were closed, and when insolvent institutions received aid, it was because they 
were perceived to be solvent when they were aided.  Bagehot (1873) recommended rules 
for central bank responses to banking crises: lend freely at a high rate only to solvent 
banks. No bank was regarded as too big to fail.  
  In 1907, the Treasury shifted large pools of funds to three large New York City 
national banks; taxpayer money was involved, and the banks were solvent.  Further, the 
actions of the New York Clearing House with the influence of JP Morgan, James 
Stillman, and George Baker, organized the effective “bail outs” of trust companies that 
were threatened with collapse from panic induced withdrawals. 
  During the Great Depression, the United States experienced bank panics with less 
effective timely intervention despite the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 26 
 
 
1913.   The inconsistent policies of the Federal Reserve System failed to stem panic 
withdrawals from the banking system. Massive US Treasury intervention to strengthen 
the capital structure of those banks allowed to reopen followed the Banking Holiday in 
March 1933. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation bought new issues of preferred 
stock of those banks deemed capable of carrying on a durable banking business. 
  In the current crisis, the Fed and the Treasury took novel initiatives to mitigate the 
repercussions of the Lehman failure and the crisis more generally. Not only did the Fed 
inject nearly a trillion dollars of reserves, it also intervened directly through purchases of 
commercial paper and the subsequent $1.25 trillion of direct purchases of mortgage 
backed securities.  The Treasury guaranteed money market funds at par value, and 
provided direct assistance to financial institutions allegedly threatened with insolvency.   
The Bagehot rule of aiding only solvent institutions was jettisoned.   
 
V  THE CURRENT CRISIS -- DIFFERENCES FROM THE PAST 
  The recent crisis did not originate with widespread runs on banks and numerous 
bank suspensions, but with large, complex, financial intermediaries (LCFIs) and large 
complex nonfinancial intermediaries (LCNFIs) – megabanks and nonbank financial 
institutions—which were allegedly too big to fail.  It was believed/argued that the 
collapse of any of these large institutions would pose excessive systemic risk of financial 
meltdown -- credit markets would cease to function and other megabanks and their 
counterparties would face insolvency as a result.  In these cases, additional liquidity 
would not solve the problem as in previous crises.  The financial system had undergone 
significant institutional changes that increased the system’s susceptibility to systemic 27 
 
 
risk.  But the mechanism generating systemic risk was not depositor bank runs; these 
institutions ran from each other.  
  Additional issues distinguish the 2008-09 financial crisis and economic downturn 
from those of either the National Banking Era or the Great Depression.  The origins of the 
recent crisis were in financial institutions that had grown disproportionately in size and 
that controlled a substantial share of total banking resources.  As a group, these 
institutions – mostly investment banks but including some large commercial banks and 
savings and loans – were heavily exposed to the risk in mortgage backed securities.  A 
combination of factors contributed to this growth: 
1.  Relaxation of the regulatory authority 
2.  Banking sector consolidation through mergers and acquisitions  
3.  Repeal of Glass-Steagall  Act of 1933, blurring the distinction between 
commercial and investment banking 
There was a spurt of financial innovation and the introduction of new financial products:  
securitization, asset-backed commercial paper, derivative assets, collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO), credit default swaps, and repurchase agreements (repos) made on 
collateral comprised of CDO assets.
28  With the inclusion of off balance sheet items, the 
leverage ratio of investment banks like Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns were as high 
as 30 to 1 (see Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin 2008).  The combination of 
increased size and product innovation resulted in a virtual revolution in the funding 
market, leading to increased leverage, heightened exposure to the predominant collateral 
(real estate backed assets), and sensitivity to the perceptions of the liquidity of repo 
collateral.   28 
 
 
  In 1907, the large banks of the New York Clearing House and the private bank of 
J. P. Morgan were not highly leveraged.  Even the trust companies, for the most part, 
were not highly leveraged (although more leveraged than national banks).  The trust 
companies, though, operated with extremely low cash reserves (5 percent as opposed to 
the 25 percent mandated for New York City national banks).  Although Morgan and the 
New York Clearing House banks did not at first want to provide liquidity to the trust 
companies, after the failure of Knickerbocker Trust, the other trusts received aid from the 
big banks.  In contrast to 1907, the recent crisis featured all LCFIs in highly leveraged 
condition.   These institutions suffered a contraction of available credit as collateral 
values fell and what started as a need for liquidity developed into a need for capital 
infusion. 
  The first casualties in the current crisis were the investment banks, many of which 
were the largest producers of the mortgage-backed securities that suffered severe declines 
in value.  The (former) investment banks did not hold deposits so they could not be “run” 
by depositors.  However, we can consider their overnight lenders as “informed” 
depositors; the counterparties that fund their activities are uninsured, so they can choose 
to withdraw their overnight funding at short notice.
29  The investment banks had 
interconnections with commercial banks and the large savings and loans also through 
their mutual exposure to the risks of the real estate market.  Counterparty contracting risk 
in the repo market and aggregate portfolio risk arising from common investments in real 
estate combined to magnify the interconnections among financial institutions in this 
recent crisis. As time passes, we are observing the extensive exposure of all banking 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 These financial products magnified the ambiguity of asset values on bank balance sheets. 
29 Among the numerous informative articles on the crisis of 2007-2009, Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton 29 
 
 
institutions – large and small – to mortgage lending, both commercial and residential, as 
well as to real estate developers.  Not only was the subprime mortgage market extended 
excessive credit, but it looks as if real estate lending was excessive at several levels.
30 
  Interbank connections have been an element of bank disturbances throughout US 
history.  Some banks have been linked through the holding of correspondent bank 
balances and when the lead bank fails its correspondents are vulnerable as well.
31  In 
earlier periods, the interconnections between banks were confined to correspondent 
relationships, holding company affiliates and chain banking networks.   But the network 
of correspondent balances never bore responsibility for generating a panic, even if it 
contributed to its severity.
32   
  What is new about the current crisis is the recent growth in bank size, the 
willingness to fund off-balance sheet, and the increasing sophistication of new financial 
products. These new financial products allow LCFIs to create private contracts through 
which the contracting parties can generate exposures to loss from a small group of 
counterparties that may ultimately justify “too big to fail” actions of policymakers.
33 We 
will need to wait for data and evidence of bank balance sheets to uncover the answer.  But 
we can venture a conjecture – in this crisis, the largest financial institutions were heavily 
leveraged, dependent upon short-term liquidity (verified in Gorton 2008), and held large 
portions of their portfolios in similar risky assets.   
  The complexity of the contracts – residential mortgage-backed securities, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2009) highlight the risk of funding activities from overnight liquidity facilities (repo market).   
30 See Brunnermeier (2009), Gorton (2008, 2009), Lowenstein (2008), and White (2008).  For a longer term 
perspective, see Schularik and Taylor (2009).  
31 The effects of the correspondent banking system during panics suggest that it may have been more of a 
mechanism for transmitting disturbances as opposed to an ultimate source of crisis.   
32 See Wicker (1980, 1996). 
33 Rochet and Tirole (1996a) offer a rationale for policymakers to favor  “too big to fail” decisions such 30 
 
 
collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, etc. – contributed to valuation 
difficulties.  The ambiguity of valuation contributed to how problems among subprime 
mortgage assets – rising defaults and foreclosure rates -- would affect the value of the 
structured investment vehicles and collateralized debt obligations (asset-backed 
securities) that were rated as AAA.  But that complexity itself did not introduce anything 
new to the underlying source of the crisis.  The underlying problem was the excessive 
credit extended to housing finance and the collapse in collateral value of nearly $12 
trillion in mortgage related assets was the most important component of the financial 
crisis.  Instead, contract complexity made investment values more opaque, and 
exacerbated the asymmetry of information between borrower and lender (the value of the 
asset as investment and the underlying probability that the borrowers will repay the loan 
[see Gorton 2009]).   
  The balance sheets of LCFIs post many numbers that presently reflect information 
fails to describe its financial condition as a result of financial innovations.  Bank 
examinations by regulators that take place today are less clear cut because of the 
extensive use of derivative contracts and off-balance-sheet entities.  Derivative financial 
products, if not managed closely by financial institutions, offer lower level bank 
employees the opportunity to put the bank’s solvency at risk because risk exposures can 
change rapidly through these contracts.
34  If a bank is then less aware of its own financial 
position, why is it not surprising that there was an increase in counter-party risk in 
markets that operate using daily financial through overnight lending facilities?   
                                                                                                                                                 
cases. 
34 In some cases, bank management demonstrated only limited control on employee actions. See 




Gorton (2008, 2009) argues that the overnight repurchase agreement market, often 
associated with the “shadow banking” sector, experienced a panic in a way similar to the 
panics of the National Banking System.  He explains that the overnight repo market often 
used structured financial products, like, for example, CDOs of mortgage asset backed 
securities, as collateral. That collateral suffered from opacity of the underlying 
investment portfolio. When subprime mortgages started to default, it was not clear how 
those defaults would affect each CDO, so in a sense it was rational to “run” away from all 
CDO collateral that could include mortgage backed assets.  Gorton refers to that response 
as a banking panic with respect to the overnight repurchase agreement market and the 
shadow banking system (see Gorton 2009).
35  This perspective on the financial crisis 
offers numerous potential paths of inquiry to determine methods to improve the operation 
of the repo market.  For example, the participants in the repo market focused attention on 
the value of collateral in a repurchase agreement.  The collateral value focus reduced the 
requirement for counterparty monitoring, until the collateral value was questioned (or 
questionable).   
Gorton’s analogy to National Banking Era panics gains additional support from an 
analogous market in which there was a primary focus on collateral value rather than 
borrower solvency.  The call loan market during the National Banking Era also focused 
on collateral values, those of the stock equity collateral upon which the loans were taken.  
Any concerns about stock equity liquidity had serious ramifications for the large, New 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/business/worldbusiness/19iht-socgen.5.10203247.html;). 
35 The haircut (or discounted valuation) on collateral (mainly, asset backed securities) for repos increased 
from virtually none, to 3 percent, to 6 percent, to 20 percent, and to 40 percent over a span of months.  
These actions curtailed the amount of liquidity that the assets to free up by the amount of the haircuts; the 
idea may sound inconsequential, but the overnight repo market was estimated at $12 trillion, so a 40 
percent haircut implies nearly $5 trillion less in liquidity available to the market. 32 
 
 
York City banks that were heavily exposed to the call loan market.   
  
VI   BANKING CRISIS: POLICYMAKERS MAKING THE CASE 
   “Bailout” is the metaphor often used to describe the actions of the public 
authorities.  Another metaphor was used to explain why the bailout took place – 
“financial meltdown” would have occurred if these financial institutions were allowed to 
fail. It seemed like a good metaphor to scare the daylights out of a doubting public, but it 
failed to convince them.  Public outrage has been directed at the US Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve bailouts.  Neither public entity made a successful rigorous effort to 
describe fully the consequences of not acting: explaining in detail what repugnant 
outcomes were expected to take place in a financial meltdown. As a result, the public had 
scant information with which to compare the costs to the taxpayer of a bailout with the 
costs to the public of policymakers taking no action.  Bailing out allegedly insolvent 
institutions with taxpayer money was a worse offense than letting the financial system 
collapse! Economists argued that creating moral hazard was more harmful than the 
potential financial meltdown. 
Testimony of Treasury and Federal Reserve officials in the AIG bailout argue 
strongly that counterparty condition was not the main motivation for paying off at par 
value (full value) the credit default swaps held by counterparties.
36  These statements 
strike us as inaccurate, if not patently false.  Policymakers, we believe, face a thankless 
choice in a crisis. When an LCFI faces insolvency or the threat of insolvency, a network 
of interbank connections may endanger the solvency of other banks with whom it is 
                                                 
36 The list includes:  Société Générale (France), Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch International, Deutsche 




37  Simply put, the failure of one LCFI may impose losses on counterparties 
such that those counterparties face a significant risk of failure as a result.  Given such 
risks, if policymakers decide that AIG presents undesirable systemic risks, then 
counterparty condition should have been a primary motivation for fulfilling the AIG 
contract on the credit default swaps.  If nothing else, the full story needs to be told in 
more detail than in SIGTARP, and with analysis of data from all counterparties. 
Swagel (2009, page 32) describes how the Treasury and Fed feared that the 
bankruptcy of American International Group (AIG) would have disastrous systemic 
effects that would be more far reaching and detrimental than were the effects of the 
Lehman Brothers’ failure.  In his analysis, Swagel directly mentions how AIG’s failure 
would force banks to raise capital, and how AIG was larger and more interconnected than 
Lehman.  Without complete information, these statements are merely consistent with our 
conjecture that the model of risk in the analysis by the policymakers must have 
incorporated anticipated “knock-on” losses to AIG counterparties that would threaten 
their solvency. 
Policymakers need to offset public criticism with an alternative and detailed 
scenario analysis of what the counter factual outcome would have been had the decision 
been made to let AIG follow Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy.  In this scenario, the 
policymaker would describe the anticipated spillover losses from AIG’s failure to its 
counterparties, the expected losses to these intermediaries, and the probability of 
insolvency among them.  Then, the policymaker could make an assessment of the 
probable effects from the loss of AIG insurance coverage for businesses and consumers, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Scotland and others. 
37 Flannery 2009 describes how governments apparently had no choice but to support potentially insolvent 34 
 
 
the losses to money market participants, the calculated losses to pension funds and 401K 
plans, and the possible, conventional risk of contagion.
38   
Further, the policymakers should also expose the evidence that convinced them of 
the likelihood of a doomsday scenario.  To make this scenario analysis believable, the 
informed public will need to see relevant information on effective bank capital, net 
exposures to key counterparties, and expected potential losses posed by failure of key 
counterparties to these banks.  At a basic level, the information could highlight bank 
counterparty exposure along with the expected losses from the liquidation value of 
collateral in a fire sale as a result of counterparty default.  The case should not be hard to 
defend, nevertheless the case should be made explicitly, even if after the fact. 
  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
  With eight major banking crises in 137 year, four took place in the National 
Banking Era, three during the Great Depression, and one took place in 2007-2009.  The 
banking instability that characterized the first 60 years contrasts strikingly with the 
relative calm of the past 75 years, with the notable exception of the recent crisis. The 
contrast is stark, and there are lists of usual culprits suggested as the main contributors to 
the recent change of fortune. 
  Major changes to the US banking structure may have increased its susceptibility 
to banking crises.  First, LFCIs have become highly leveraged relative to historical 
norms, leaving little financial cushion for losses. Secondly, the extensive use of 
derivative assets and the creation of new and highly complex bank assets may obfuscate a 
                                                                                                                                                 
financial institutions during the 2007-2009 crisis. 
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bank’s financial exposure implied by the contracts to counterparties. Finally, the 
interconnectedness of LCFIs has increased and counterparty exposures may have grown 
to threaten a domino-like transmission of insolvency across LCFIs.  Other candidates 
include the consolidation of mega-banks through bank mergers, the repeal of Glass-
Steagall reducing the distinction between investment and commercial banks, and the 
globalization of the financial markets.  It will take time to determine how many of these 
reasons are relevant for explaining the recent financial crisis. 
  The banking panics of the National Banking Era and the Great Depression 
resulted from depositor withdrawal and liquidity based suspensions, the conventional 
form of systemic risk arising from the loss of depositor confidence in banks or the 
banking system. During the National Banking Era, the suspension of convertibility of 
bank deposits into cash was usually capable of attenuating bank runs. Further, the source 
of connection between banks was through correspondent bank balances, interbank loans, 
or shared exposure to assets that trades in an external market.  Balance sheet data could 
measure those exposures and active monitoring of counterparty conditions by banks was 
the main method of limiting the impact of counterparty distress. 
  The predominant mechanism giving risk to systemic risk in the recent crisis arose 
from loss of confidence between banks and other banks, or counterparty risk.
39  
Interdependence among institutions threatened to transmit shocks throughout a network 
of banks, reflecting the risk that counterparties could fail, default on payment, and 
transmit further losses to other banks.  The threat of numerous insolvencies resulting 
from an initial failure is the manifestation of systemic risk, and it provides a justification 
                                                                                                                                                 
funds was an example of a classic banking panic on a specific type of intermediary. 
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to aid an insolvent LCFI to prevent worse spillover failures as a result.  In the recent 
crisis, policymakers appealed to the existence of a network of interconnections among 
financial institutions as the mechanism to transmit losses through the financial system, 
but there should be a full evaluation of the extenuating circumstances when the evidence 
on bank solvency becomes fully available. 
  The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers signaled the beginning of the most 
treacherous period in the financial crisis of 2007-2009; in the aftermath, credit markets 
were disrupted, there were large losses transmitted to other large institutions, and 
policymakers became reticent to test the “let them fail” waters again with the impending 
bankruptcy of AIG.  The potential transmission of additional losses from AIG across the 
financial markets to highly leveraged institutions, many in shaky financial condition 
already, made it difficult to envision a benign outcome arising from inaction. 
  Too big to fail has been exposed as the likely policy response to financial distress 
as a result of the recent crisis.  The motivation for such a policy response is the 
mechanism generating systemic risk arising from extensive counterparty exposures.  
From a public policy perspective, it is critical to establish the factual basis for the policy, 
namely, to illustrate explicitly the counterparty exposures in balance sheet (and off 
balance sheet) measures. In a perfect model of this mechanism, we would be able to 
measure and monitor systemic risk and thereby establish a foundation for limiting the 
negative spillover effects of a large financial failure.  No perfect model exists, but a 
model that attempts to measure the risk arising from this mechanism will help convey a 
clearer sense of the rationale of the policymaker. 
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  What we have learned from comparing the recent financial crisis to historical 
banking panics is that there are important differences.  The conventional treatments for 
financial crises in historical episodes do not alleviate the ills of the recent crisis. Central 
bank liquidity initiatives were mildly palliative, but the solution to the recent crisis 
required government capital infusions, an increase of bank reserves to an unprecedented 
level, and the Federal Reserve purchase of a large amount of mortgage backed securities.  
These initiatives show how restoring confidence in the banking system today requires 
restoring bank solvency, which is a markedly different solution than restoring liquidity in 




Real GNP data, quarterly, from 1875 to 1940 are taken from Balke and Gordon (1987). 
Data for the following series: 
1)  call loan interest rate 
2)  the commercial paper rate 
3)  the currency held by public 
4)  adjusted demand deposits of commercial banks 
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